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WHEN THE DEFAULT Is No PENALTY: NEGOTIATING
PRIVACY AT THE NTIA
MARGOT E. KAMINSK#t
ABSTRACT
Consumer privacy protection is largely within the purview of the
Federal Trade Commission. In recent years, however, the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the Depart-
ment of Commerce has hosted multistakeholder negotiations on consum-
er privacy issues. The NTIA process has addressed mobile apps, facial
recognition, and most recently, drones. It is meant to serve as a venue for
industry self-regulation. Drawing on the literature on co-regulation and
on penalty defaults, I suggest that the NTIA process struggles to success-
fully extract industry expertise and participation against a dearth of fed-
eral data privacy law and enforcement. This problem is most exacerbated
in precisely the areas the NTIA currently addresses: consumer privacy
protection around new technologies and practices. In fact, industry may
be more likely to see the NTIA process as itself penalty-producing and,
thus, be disincentivized from meaningful participation or adoption.
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The United States famously does not have omnibus federal data pri-
vacy law.' Instead, existing federal privacy law regulates the market or
2technologies by sector. One law governs children's privacy; another
governs health privacy;3 another governs the use of information about
videos that you watch.4 New technologies and practices-ranging from
mobile phones apps to facial recognition to drones-create significant
data privacy issues that federal privacy law does not explicitly cover. The
federal government's current approach to data privacy concerns raised by
these technologies is the under-examined multistakeholder process at the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). 5
The NTIA is not the federal agency that springs to mind when dis-
cussing consumer privacy. Most think of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) as the consumer privacy agency because the FTC has used its Sec-
tion 5 authority to govern both consumer privacy and data security.6 Per-
haps the NTIA's relative obscurity is due to the fact that while the De-
partment of Commerce has long been involved in setting privacy policy,
the NTIA's current efforts are relatively new. The NTIA has been in-
volved in this particular multistakeholder process since only 2012.7 Or
perhaps this obscurity stems from the fact that the NTIA does not enforce
these best practices; it serves as a neutral negotiating forum for private
stakeholders to arrive at these "voluntary, enforceable" best practices.8
Whatever the reason, the lack of discussion of the NTIA multi-
stakeholder process in the literature is a significant oversight. The NTIA
multistakeholder process is a key component of the White House's tout-
1. Paul M. Schwartz, The Value of Privacy Federalism, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY
324, 324-27 (Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015).
2. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(2012).
3. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 § 1177, 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).
4. See Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
5. The NTIA multistakeholder process was mentioned in passing by Justin Brookman. Justin
Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 355,
363, 363 nn.49-50 (2015).
6. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598-606 (2014).
7. Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Mobile Application Transparency, NAT'L TELECOMM.
& INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Mobile Application Transparency],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2013/privacy-multistakeholder-process-mobile-
application-transparency.
8. Id. (stating the NTIA's role in the process is "to provide a forum for discussion and con-
sensus-building among stakeholders"); see also Privacy Multistakeholder Meetings Regarding
Facial Recognition Techonology: February-June 2014, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 3,
2013) [hereinafter Facial Recognition Technology], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/2013/privacy-multistakeholder-meetings-regarding-facial-recognition-technology-feb.
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ed approach to data privacy.9 The success or failure of this process has
significant implications for how we regulate data privacy going forward.
Moreover, what's happening at the NTIA has broader implications
for discussions of delegating regulation to private actors or incorporating
standards that private actors have devised. Good governance likely needs
the industry and technological expertise that private actors possess. The
story of the NTIA's multistakeholder process shows, however, that cer-
tain regulatory conditions may be necessary to get private actors to put
that expertise towards governing themselves.
I begin by describing the current multistakeholder process at the
NTIA and explaining its origins. I then ask the necessary question: Is the
process actually working? Answering that largely in the negative, I bring
together literature on co-regulation with literature on penalty defaults to
suggest that while private expertise may be necessary for effective gov-
ernance in this realm, private actors will not co-regulate in the desired
way unless the government sets a regulatory default that is worse than
enforcement of best practices. I close with some important lessons
learned.
I. WHAT IS THE NTIA DOING IN CONSUMER PRIVACY REGULATION?
Because regulating data privacy entails regulating fast-developing
technologies, many have suggested that private industry is best equipped
to self-regulate.o The government faces an expertise problem: it inevita-
bly cannot gather expertise fast enough to keep up with technological
development." The obvious concern, however, is that private industry
9. Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, H.R.
1053, 114th Cong. § 301 (2015) [hereinafter Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-
draft.pdf (listing the multistakeholder process as the first step the Secretary of Commerce may make
when deciding if a certain code of conduct should be considered a safe harbor); see also WHITE
HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 23-27 (2012) [herein-
after PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012], https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
("The Administration encourages [all] relevant groups to participate in multistakeholder processes to
develop codes of conduct that implement [the general principles in the Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights Act of 2015]. . . . [The] NTIA will lead the Department of Commerce's convening of stake-
holders.").
10. DEP'T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND
INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 5 (2010),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf privacygreenpaper 12162010.pdf; see also
David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 370-77 (2014) (describing
how the expertise of private industry actors in the area of regulating data privacy can be borrowed to
assist government in its regulation of the same); Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online
Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 457-59
(2011).
I1. Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Les-
sons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 98-99 (2013) (footnote omitted)
(explaining one reason the government adopted the multistakeholder process was its fear that
"[s]low-moving, notice-and-comment rulemaking [would] not be able to keep up with rapidly
changing technologies, business practices, and consumer expectations. Moreover, the regulators
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will self-regulate with its own best interests in mind.12 Thus the crucial
question is: How do we spur private industry involvement in data privacy
regulation without allowing it to capture the process at the expense of the
general public?
The White House's recent answer to this question is the proposed
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act (the Act), based on an earlier blue-
print announced in a 2012 policy document.13 The Act would create
backstop federal privacy legislation consisting of a Privacy Bill of Rights
(Title I), enforceable by states' attorneys general and the FTC (Title II).
Against this backstop, private stakeholders could negotiate their own
industry-specific codes of conduct at the Department of Commerce (Title
III).14 Upon approval by the FTC, these negotiated codes of conduct
would serve as a safe harbor from liability for violating the Act.15
The White House has touted this approach in a number of policy
documents addressing Big Data.16 The problem for the White House is
that Congress has not enacted the Act-not even close. With criticisms
from both privacy advocates and regulatory skeptics, the administration
could not find Congressional sponsors for the bill.1 7 In the meantime, the
Executive Branch decided to attempt this approach alone.
Starting in 2012, the White House directed the NTIA, which is
housed in the Department of Commerce, to begin convening meetings
between privacy stakeholders to negotiate sector-specific "legally en-
forceable" codes of conduct.'8 The White House explained that the NTIA
"has the necessary authority and expertise" to conduct these meetings,
based on its past participation in "other areas of Internet policy." 9 While
themselves [would] not be able to learn enough about quickly evolving industries to design intelli-
gent rules for them").
12. Hirsch, supra note 10, at 458-59; Thaw, supra note 10, at 331.
13. Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft, supra note 9, at I (originally pro-
posed in Feb. 2012; Act proposed in Feb. 2015); see also PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note
9, at 1.
14. Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft, supra note 9, at 17; see also
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA
AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 38, 40-41 (2014) [hereinafter BIG DATA AND
PRIVACY],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast big data and privacy
-_may_2014.pdf.
15. Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 Draft, supra note 9, at 17.
16. See BIG DATA AND PRIVACY, supra note 14, at 40-41; WHITE HOUSE, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 8-9 (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20150204_BigData-SeizingOpportunitiesPr
eserving Values Memo.pdf; PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 6.
17. Alex Wilhelm, White House Drops 'Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act' Draft,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/27/white-house-drops-consumer-
privacy-bill-of-rights-act-draft/.
1 8. Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7.
19. PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 26. As statutory authority, the White
House states "[the] NTIA is designated by statute as the 'President's principal adviser on telecom-
munications policies pertaining to the Nation's economic and technological advancement .... " Id.
at 26 n.29 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2)(D) (2012)).
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the NTIA is no stranger to privacy questions-a 1995 report discusses
telecommunications privacy issues, for example20-it has been delegated
an increasingly active role in privacy policy in recent years. The Depart-
ment of Commerce established the Internet Policy Task Force in 2010,
coordinating efforts at the NTIA with policy efforts at other agencies
such as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. One of the Task Force's
initiatives is to address Internet privacy.21 The NTIA's multistakeholder
meetings fall under the domain of this Internet Policy Task Force. The
White House's recent placement of privacy multistakeholder meetings at
the NTIA involves the agency in consumer privacy policy.
The White House explained in its 2012 Privacy Blueprint that, ide-
ally, companies would voluntarily adopt the privacy codes of conduct
developed at the NTIA. Once adopted, the code would become enforcea-
ble by the FTC under Section 5 of the FTC Act, "just as a company is
bound today to follow its privacy statements."22 On its face, this policy
sounds relatively nonthreatening to companies. They may negotiate
codes of conduct at the NTIA if they feel like it, and they will be subject
to FTC enforcement only if they choose to adopt a particular code of
conduct. Thus the model of how the NTIA process will work is that it
should produce voluntary codes of conduct, signed by industry actors,
and enforceable by the FTC only against those who sign on.
Even within the Privacy Blueprint, however, the White House ap-
23pears to suggest broader enforcement potential. On the one hand, codes
of conduct might operate as a de facto safe harbor from FTC enforce-
ment. On the other hand, the FTC might look to codes of conduct to es-
tablish the industry standards undergirding a Section 5 enforcement ac-
tion. In other words, stakeholders may fear engaging in the NTIA pro-
cess because the resulting industry code of conduct could trigger, rather
than prevent, FTC enforcement action.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND THE NII: SAFEGUARDING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
21. DEP'T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, CYBERSECURITY, INNOVATION
AND THE INTERNET ECONOMY iv (2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/CybersecurityGreen-
Paper FinalVersion.pdf ("In April 2010, Commerce Secretary Gary Locke established a Depart-
ment-wide Internet Policy Task Force to address key Internet policy challenges.").
22. PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 27; see also Brookman, supra note 5, at
363 n.49 ("The FTC would have jurisdiction over such codes because a statement of adherence to a
code would be a consumer representation; if a company ended up violating such a statement, that
would constitute a deceptive business practice under the law."); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
FTC Settles with Twelve Companies Falsely Claiming to Comply with International Safe Harbor
Privacy Framework (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-
settles-twelve-companies-falsely-claiming-comply (discussing how the FTC has enforced voluntary
industry codes in the past); FTC v. Google 2012 - Misrepresentation of Compliance with NAI Code
a Key Element, IT LAw GROUP (2014), http://www.itlawgroup.com/resources/articles/69-ftc-v-
google-2012-misrepresentation-of-compliance-with-nai-code-a-key-element.
23. PRIVACY BLUEPRINT OF 2012, supra note 9, at 30 ("In any investigation or enforcement
action related to the subject matter of one or more codes, the FTC should consider the company's
adherence to the codes favorably.").
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Is this fear that codes of conduct will be enforced as industry stand-
ards against non-signatories reasonable? The FTC's privacy orders have
been described by leading scholars in the area as creating "codified
... best practices."24 These scholars in fact characterize the ideal version
of the FTC's enforcement process as waiting for an industry standard to
emerge and then codifying it through FTC privacy orders.25 In enforce-
ment actions, the FTC usually compares a particular company's conduct
to actual "industry standards writ large."26 For example, in recent litiga-
tion challenging the FTC's authority to regulate data security under Sec-
tion 5's unfairness prong, the FTC explained that to determine what con-
stitutes "reasonable" data security, companies may look to, among other
27things, actual industry best practices. The FTC also issues best practic-
es as guidance, but tends not to rely on its own best practices for en-
28forcement purposes.
The question then is whether NTIA codes of conduct will be treated
more like the FTC's own guidance in the area-that is to say, not gener-
ally used for determining the industry standard for enforcement purpos-
es-or treated more like actual industry standards, which are frequently
referred to in enforcement actions. At least initially, the FTC would be
unlikely to look to NTIA best practices alone to determine reasonable-
ness. However, if the NTIA process works the way the White House
envisions, it will result in standards widely adopted by industry leaders,
which would consequently nudge or dictate the industry standards on
which FTC enforcement relies. If the NTIA system works as the White
House envisions-creating industry codes of conduct that are then actu-
ally adopted by the majority of players in an industry-it is hard to imag-
me the FTC will not eventually look to the codes for guidance as to the
industry standard in a sector in determining which enforcement actions to
pursue.
24. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 586. Solove and Hartzog acknowledge, however, that
currently, privacy best practices are more amorphous than their cybersecurity equivalents. Id at 657
("With regard to privacy, what constitutes good practice is more in dispute, although there are cer-
tainly some practices about which consensus has developed.").
25. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential ofFTC Data Protection,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2265 (2015) ("The FTC can wait until a consensus around specific
standards develops in the industry and then codify them as this happens.").
26. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 626-27 (quoting E-mail from David Vladeck, Dir.,
Bureau of Consumer Prot., to authors (Oct. 3, 2013, 1:12 PM) (on file with the Columbia Law Re-
view)).
27. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 616-17 (D.N.J. 2014) (noting
that Wyndham could look to "industry guidance sources that [Wyndham] . . . itself seems to measure
its own data-security practices against").
28. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 626-27 (citing E-mail from David Vladeck, Dir.,
Bureau of Consumer Prot., to authors (Oct. 3, 2013, 1:12 PM) (on file with the Columbia Law Re-
view)).
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II. IS THE NTIA MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESS WORKING?
The White House has directed the NTIA to convene multistake-
holder discussions on consumer privacy in three sectors: mobile applica-
tions;29 facial recognition technology;30 and most recently, drones.31 The
NTIA has convened discussions in these areas, concluding the code of
conduct for transparency in mobile applications in 2013.32 Discussions of
the facial recognition code stalled in June 2015, when consumer advo-
cate groups walked out of the process in protest.33 Discussions of drones
concluded in 2016; this author participated in them.34
The important question, for purposes of evaluating both how the
White House currently handles data privacy and the viability of any fu-
ture version of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, is whether the
NTIA multistakeholder process is working. In three words: it is not.
The success of the efforts can be judged along several axes.5 First,
how wide is participation in the process? Does it bring in meaningful
representation from both industry and public interest groups, as intend-
ed? Second, how successful are the efforts at reaching consensus? Does
the final code reflect influence by diverse participants? And third: How
widely is the code actually adopted? We have evidence on the third ques-
tion only with respect to the NTIA's mobile app work, but there is initial
evidence as to participation in the other two processes. As charted below,
for all three questions, in all three sets of negotiations, the answers are
not encouraging.
A. Mobile Apps
The NTIA's first efforts focused on driving transparency in the pri-
vacy practices of mobile applications. The central issue was how to
meaningfully alert mobile phone users to what kinds of information mo-
bile phone applications collected and shared. This conversation was
29. See Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7.
30. See Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 8.
31. See Multistakeholder Process: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO.
ADMIN. (June 21, 2016) [hereinafter Unmanned Aircraft Systems], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/2015/multistakeholder-process-unmanned-aircraft-systems.
32. Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7; Angelique Carson, Did NTIA's Multi-
Stakeholder Process Work? Depends on Whom You Ask, IAAP: PRIVACY ADVISOR (Sep. 3, 2013),
https://iapp.org/news/a/did-ntias-multi-stakeholder-process-work-depends-whom-you-ask/.
33. Natasha Singer, Consumer Groups Back Out of Federal Talks on Face Recognition, N.Y.
TIMES: BITS (June 16, 2015, 12:10 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/consumer-
groups-back-out-of-federal-talks-on-face-recognition/.
34. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra note 31.
35. Ira Rubinstein suggested a six-factor normative framework for evaluating the efficacy of
co-regulation: efficiency, openness and transparency, completeness when compared to FIPPs, strate-
gies to address free rider problems, oversight and enforcement, and use of second-generation design
features. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6
ISJLP 355, 380 (2011). My normative framework roughly maps on to a subset of these factors:
openness and transparency (who are the actors?); completeness when compared to other codes of
conduct; and free rider problems. See id.
2016] 931
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largely about what constitutes meaningful notice in the smartphone
space. Since U.S. privacy largely centers around the idea of notice and
consent, figuring out how to apply that model to small, mobile, ubiqui-
tous screens is a central policy question in data privacy law.36
The initial meeting resulted in relatively high participation and sixty
separate proposals; over time, however, fewer participants were willing
to remain involved.37 The drafting ended in the summer of 2013.38 A
number of civil liberties organizations supported the draft, but the Center
for Digital Democracy (CDD) abstained and called instead for broad
consumer privacy legislation and FTC regulation.39 The CDD explained
that the stakeholder process relied too heavily on voluntary and thus in-
adequate revelations by industry members about their practices.40
In terms of substance, the NTIA code can be compared to the FTC's
February 2013 recommended best practices for mobile app transparen-
cy.4 1 The FTC recommends that apps should provide just-in-time disclo-
sures and obtain affirmative express consent when (a) collecting sensi-
tive information outside the platform's API, or (b) sharing sensitive data
with third parties.4 2 The NTIA code, by contrast, suggests use of a single
"short form notice"-that is, a notice that is easy to read and under-
stand-that is "readily available from the application," but crucially only
"encourages but does not require presentation of [the] short form notice
prior to installation or use of the application."43
These are significantly different notice mechanisms. One (the
FTC's approach) actively alerts a user to the collection or sharing of sen-
sitive information at the moment the information is collected or shared.
The other (the code of conduct's approach) is potentially hidden within
the application, and need not be actively shown to the user at all. To be
fair, many mobile applications at the time of negotiations had no privacy
policies; the NTIA's modest proposal of adoption of a short-form policy
looks like an improvement in that context. The disparity between the
NTIA's suggested form of notice and the FTC's guidance on the issue,
however, suggests limits on the idea that the NTIA process will arrive at
36. See Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 787-89 (2014).
37. Brookman, supra note 5, at 363-64.
38. See Mobile Application Transparency, supra note 7.
39. Jeff Chester, CDD Urges FTC to Review Proposed NTIA Code of Conduct, CTR. FOR
DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (July 26, 2013), https://www.democraticmedia.org/cdd-urges-ftc-review-
proposed-ntia-code-conduct; see also Carson, supra note 32.
40. Chester, supra note 39 ("The stakeholder process is intrinsically flawed. It principally
relies on industry to provide accurate information on the practices they actually engage in.").
41. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES i-iii, 12 (2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-
through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/1 30201 mobileprivacyreport.pdf
42. Id. at 23.
43. SHORT FORM NOTICE CODE OF CONDUCT TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY IN MOBILE APP
PURCHASES 2, 5 (NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., Redline Draft 2013),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/july_25_code draft.pdf.
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"best" practices, versus constitute a race to the bottom. Clarity is also a
concern. A study of the NTIA proposal conducted by researchers at Car-
negie Mellon concluded that "the current set of NTIA categories does not
appear to offer a high level of transparency for users.""
Perhaps the most damning observation about the mobile apps pro-
cess is that it did not result in widespread industry adoption. Consumer
Watchdog pointed out that, while twenty industry participants "support-
ed" the code, only two "endorsed" it-meaning, only two industry partic-
ipants were willing to publicly commit to putting the code into practice,
thus making it clearly legally enforceable. 5 On the other side of the is-
sue, industry representatives raised usability concerns, explaining that the
data gathering practices discussed at the meetings were not representa-
tive of practices in real life.46 According to one commentator, "by and
large the principles have been ignored by industry."47 The NTIA process
thus faces a significant free rider problem: industry may profit from the
goodwill associated with the process, without taking on the costs of actu-
ally implementing even the lenient code.48
B. Facial Recognition
Next, the NTIA convened stakeholder discussions on facial recogni-
tion technologies.49 Facial recognition technologies come in many forms.
They can involve analysis of existing social media imagery, or they can
involve surveillance of individuals in real and unexpected physical spac-
es. In the second context, facial recognition technologies raise many of
the same policy questions as the Internet of Things: companies can use
the technologies on individuals without a user agreement, and even with-
out notice to the individual.50 The issues raised are complex and entail
discussing whether our approach to data privacy online is appropriate for
data privacy entwined with the real physical world.
The NTIA process around facial recognition stalled in the summer
of 2015, when consumer protection groups walked out of the negotia-
44. REBECCA BALEBAKO, RICHARD SHAY & LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, IS YOUR INSEAM A
BIOMETRIC? EVALUATING THE UNDERSTANDABILITY OF MOBILE PRIVACY NOTICE CATEGORIES 10
(2013), https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech reports/CMUCyLabl3011 .pdf.
45. John M. Simpson, Effort to Craft Apps "Transparency Code" Shows Futility of Multi-
Stakeholder Process, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (July 25, 2013),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/effort-craft-apps-%E2%80%9Ctransparency-
code%E2%80%9D-shows-futility-multi-stakeholder-process
46. Grant Gross, A Federal Push for Mobile Privacy Has Failed, Critics Say, PCWORLD
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2047775/critic-ntias-mobile-privacy-push-has-
failed.html.
47. Brookman, supra note 5, at 363.
48. Rubinstein, supra note 35, 379-80.
49. Privacy Multistakeholder Process: Facial Recognition Technology, NAT'L TELECOMM. &
INFO. ADMIN. (June 11, 2015) [hereinafter NTIA, Privacy], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-
publication/201 5/privacy-multistakeholder-process-facial-recognition-technology.
50. See Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People's Things, 51
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 647 (2015).
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tions.51 The groups explained in a letter that they chose to walk out of the
process because companies refused to even engage with the idea of opt-
in consent to facial recognition.52 Opt-in consent has been the basis of
state legislation, and consumer protection and privacy organizations
raised serious objections to the fact that it was not on the table at the
NTIA. 53 It is unclear from the NTIA website whether the process has
continued beyond July 28, 2015.54
The latest discussion draft of the code, evidently proposed by the
International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA), dates from July 22,
2015. 5 The draft focuses on transparency and data security, with trans-
parency constituting a dual approach of (i) available privacy policies, and
(ii) notice that the technology is being used.56 The draft language is
sparse, largely repeating the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),
such as collection limitation, the purpose specification principle, the use
limitation principle, etc.
What little specific information the draft proposes, however, shows
the limitations that frustrated privacy advocates.57 While the draft advo-
cates notice, it explains that such notice will be highly context-
dependent. The draft states that notice should depend on the type of per-
sonal data used, how that data will be stored and used, and reasonable
expectations of use of that data.58 In other words, companies may t their
own discretion, using vague factors, determine whether and when indi-
viduals might even receive notice of the use of individually-identifying
facial recognition technologies.
The similarly sparse draft of NTIA's stakeholder guidelines also re-
lies on notice and transparency.59 The guidelines explain that entities
using facial recognition technologies should "make available to subjects"
their policies regarding biometric collection and use.60 They explain that
51. Singer, supra note 33.
52. Andrea Peterson, The Government's Plan to Regulate Facial Recognition Tech Is Falling
Apart, WASH. POST: SWITCH (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/06/16/the-govemments-plan-to-regulate-facial-recognition-tech-is-falling-apart/.
53. See id. (citing Illinois and Texas as examples).
54. NTIA, Privacy, supra note 49 (announcing the most recent meeting as occurring July 28,
2015).
55. NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
COMMERCIAL BIOMETRIC USE (2014) [hereinafter NTIA, PRIVACY BEST PRACTICE],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ibia-ntia-7-22-15 discussion_draft.pdf.
56. Id. at 2.
57. See Alvaro M. Bedoya, Why I Walked Out of Facial Recognition Negotiations, SLATE
(June 30, 2015, 11:56 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future tense/2015/06/facial recognitionprivacy talks wh
y_i_walkedout.html;%20https://cdt.org/blog/cdt-withdraws-from-the-ntia-facial-recognition-
process/.
58. Id at 2; NTIA, PRIVACY BEST PRACTICE, supra note 55, at 2.
59. GUIDELINES FOR THE COLLECTION AND USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION § 3 (NAT'L
TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., Stakeholder Draft 2015).
60. Id.
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notice should be given before the technology is employed, or alternative-
ly may be given after employment if the subject can control use of the
data.6 ' Like the discussion draft, the stakeholder guidelines rely ies on a
number of the FIPPs; and like the discussion draft, they nowhere con-
template that subjects might justifiably opt out of facial recognition-or
be given the option to opt in, to begin with.
The FTC, by contrast, in October 2012 recommended best practices
for facial recognition technologies that included an opt-out mechanism,
and even more stringent opt-in consent in some cases.62 The FTC de-
scribed a "sliding scale approach to notice and choice," including choice
mechanisms such as an ability to "walk away."63 The FTC also contem-
plated more active choice mechanisms, such as "requir[ing] consumer
interaction prior to processing the consumer's image."6 As a second
point of reference, the EU Article 29 Working Group report on facial
recognition from March 2012 explicitly requires opt-in, requiring "valid
consent . .. prior to acquisition" and notice constituting "sufficient in-
formation relating to when a camera is operating for the purpose of facial
recognition."6 5
This is not to suggest that the NTIA process must or even should ar-
rive at best practices in compliance with EU standards, or even identical
to FTC recommendations. The process of producing NTIA codes of con-
duct is different, and perhaps the goal is different as well. But it is nota-
ble that both with respect to mobile applications and with respect to faci-
al recognition, the NTIA's process arrived at notably lower standards of
consumer privacy protection than those recommended by the FTC.
Again, even those standards face a free rider problem: nobody appears to
have adopted them as a working code.
C. Drones
In February 2015, the President instructed the NTIA to convene dis-
cussions about privacy and drones.6 6 In May 2016, the NTIA announced
the completion of the process.67
61. Id.






65. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 02/2012 on Facial Recognition in
Online and Mobile Services, at 7 (Mar. 22, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wpl92_en.pdf.
66. See Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguard-
ing Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,





Drones, or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), pose similar but not
identical privacy concerns to facial recognition technologies. Again,
drones involve the surveillance of nonconsenting and often unknowing
individuals in physical spaces. Unlike facial recognition, however,
drones also enable surveillance from new and unexpected vantage points,
reducing the efficacy of physical barriers.68
Participation by civil society in the NTIA drone process was mark-
edly lower than the original level of participation in facial recognition
discussions. Many of the civil liberties groups that participated in and
withdrew from facial recognition discussions were largely absent from
the discussions on drones, including the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and CDD. 69 After the
best practices were completed and released in May 2016, the ACLU,
EFF, and Access Now released a letter criticizing the substance of the
final agreement, noting that the document does not represent "best prac-
tices."70 The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), by contrast,
issued a statement of support for the process and results.71
Conversations during the process were derailed on several occa-
sions with discussions of whether it was fair for the NTIA to single out
drones for technology-specific regulation-a valid policy point that was
nonetheless moot in light of the President's express Memorandum to the
NTIA to focus on drones. One group of stakeholders took it upon them-
selves to come up with a document listing the positive social benefits of
drones.72 Another meeting devoted significant time to discussing First
Amendment concerns with regulating drone newsgatherers and videog-
raphers.73 These concerns are legitimate, but were perhaps overstated in
67. NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR UAS PRIVACY,
TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY § 2(a) [hereinafter FINAL BEST PRACTICES],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/voluntarybestpracticesfor uasprivacytranspar
encyand accountability_0.pdf; see also Natasha Lomas, US Agency Issues Privacy Guidance for
Drone Operators, TECHCRUNCH (May 20, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/20/privacy-
guidance-for-drone-operators-issued-by-us-agency/.
68. See Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113,
1148 (2015).
69. See Peterson, supra note 52.
70. Letter from Access Now et al., to John Morris, Assoc. Adm'r & Dir. of Internet Policy,
Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. (May 24, 2016) [hereinafter Access Now Letter],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/aclu access now eff 5-
23_letter on_uasbestpractices.pdf.
71. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection at Heart of NTIA Best Practices for Drones, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (May 18, 2016) [hereinafter Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection],
https://cdt.org/press/privacy-and-civil-liberties-protections-at-heart-of-ntia-best-practices-for-
drones/.
72. NTIA Working Grp. on UAS: Positive Societal Benefits 1-8 (Nov. 19, 2015) (Nat'1 Tele-
comm. & Info. Admin., Working Draft), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/2015-ll -
19_compilation of positive societal benefits -_ntia workinggrou.pdf.
73. Letter from Charles D. Tobin, Partner, Holland & Knight LLP, to Nat'l Telecomms. &
Info. Admin. (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia best-practices -
11.17.2015_news media coalition.pdf.
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the context of attempts to develop voluntary industry privacy best prac-
tices rather than direct government regulation.
The group worked off of a Combined Draft74 containing elements
from an earlier draft proposed by civil liberties organization, the Center
for Democracy & Technology (CDT), and elements from an earlier
draft proposed by the law firm Hogan Lovells.76 The two proposals con-
verged on the basic structure of the issues, including provisions on no-
tice, collection, sharing, and data security policies. Both agreed, for ex-
ample, that best practices involve informing others about the use of
drones to gather data. Both agreed, as well, that best practices for
commercial drone use should entail avoiding the use of drones "for the
specific purpose of persistent and continuous collection of personal or
private data about specific individuals."78
The two proposals differed significantly, however, on important de-
tails. Some of the most marked differences between the two proposals
are as follows. One major difference concerned using drones to gather
data without consent. The CDT proposal suggested that in the absence of
a compelling need or informed consent, commercial UAS operators
should avoid using UAS "for the specific purpose of intentionally col-
lecting personal data . . . [w]here the operator knows the data subject has
a reasonable expectation of privacy."79 The Hogan Lovells proposal,
while suggesting that companies should as a general matter aim to mini-
mize data collection,80 allowed drones to be used to purposefully collect
personal data without consent. The final version adopted the CDT lan-
guage, but the final language includes a loophole for drone operators to
collect personal data without consent if they can demonstrate a "compel-
ling need" to do so. 82
Instead of addressing the gathering of information, the Hogan
Lovells proposal largely targeted misuse of the data collected. The draft
stated that personal data gathered without consent or not pursuant to a
contract should not be used "in an adverse manner" for employment,
74. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., UAS PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES (2015),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/cdtuasbestpractices draftv2_111615_clean.pdf.
75. See id. at 1.
76. See HOGAN LOVELLS, PRIVACY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY-VOLUNTARY
BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMERCIAL AND PRIVATE USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (2015),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/bestpracticesdraftl 1_19_hoganlovells.pdf.
77. Id. at 4; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH, supra note 74, at 4.
78. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH, supra note 74, at 6; HOGAN LOVELLS, supra note 76, at
4.
79. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 76, at 6.
80. HOGAN LOVELLS & CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR
COMMERCIAL AND PRIVATE USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: PRIVACY, TRANSPARENCY,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2015) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT],
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/combined-draft workinggroup_12_22_2015.pdf.
81. Id. at 7 (noting that unlike the CDT proposal, the Hogan Lovell's proposal contains no
consent requirement).
82. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 4.
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credit, or health care-related decisions.83 The Hogan Lovells draft envi-
sioned permitting other commercial uses of the data.4 The final version
of the best practices, while adopting more restrictions on gathering in-
formation than envisioned in the Hogan Lovells draft, mirrors the Hogan
Lovells draft in listing only several specific prohibited information uses,
such as determining employment eligibility or credit eligibility.85
A third significant difference involved the treatment of the airspace
above private property. The CDT proposal was adamant on this issue,
suggesting that UAS operators should make a reasonable effort (a) not to
enter private property or airspace without informed prior consent, and (b)
to minimize operations even in public airspace over private property
without informed prior consent.86 The Hogan Lovells draft took a differ-
ent approach. It suggested that drone operators should make a reasonable
effort to prevent drones that collect personal data from entering public
airspace over private property "if the UAS operation will substantially
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the property."87 This, it should be
noted, effectively just restates state nuisance law. The final version of the
best practices suggests that drone operators should make a reasonable
effort to minimize operations over or within private property without
consent or legal authority, but creates a significant loophole where such
flight impedes the purpose for which the UAS is used (which could be
anything) or conflicts with FAA guidelines.88
A fourth significant difference involves the use of drone-gathered
information for targeted marketing. While the Hogan Lovells proposal
suggested that Commercial UAS operators should avoid using or sharing
personal data for use in targeted marketing, they restrict that suggestion
to situations "[w]here the operator has actual knowledge that the data
subject has an expectation of privacy."89 In other words, when a drone
operator lacks actual knowledge of an expectation of privacy, it can use
personal data for use in targeted marketing. By contrast, the CDT version
suggested that UAS operators should make a reasonable effort to avoid
using or sharing personal data for marketing purposes, unless it has been
obfuscated or deidentified, or the data subject provides informed prior
consent to disclosure.9 The Hogan Lovells system envisioned a default
of allowing use of drone surveillance as an input for individually targeted
marketing; the CDT version envisioned a default of disallowing it, unless
the data subject consents or has been deidentified.
83. HOGAN LOVELLS, supra note 76, at 7-8.
84. Id. at 9.
85. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5.
86. BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT, supra note 80, at 8.
87. Id
88. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 3.
89. BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT, supra note 80, at 10.
90. Id.
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The final best practices document echoes the CDT proposal, direct-
ing drone operators to make a reasonable effort to avoid sharing personal
data for marketing purposes without consent.91 However, the best prac-
tices expressly contemplate using drone-gathered data for marketing in
the aggregate. This leaves significant incentives in place for gathering
information about individuals, even if that information will later be re-
duced to statistical information.92
A fifth significant difference between the CDT and Hogan Lovells
proposals concerned the extent to which the subject of drone surveillance
can access, correct, or delete the gathered data. The Hogan Lovells pro-
posal suggested allowing data subjects "reasonable means to review"
gathered data, and that UAS operators should take reasonable measures
to maintain data accuracy.93 It did not, however, provide any mechanism
for individuals to request the deletion of data. The CDT proposal sug-
gested that if an individual requests that a UAS operator "correct, de-
stroy, obfuscate, or deidentify personal data about the individual," in the
absence of need for that data to "fulfill a purpose for which the UAS is
used," the UAS operator should honor this request.94 The final version
suggests only that UAS operators establish a process for receiving re-
quests to delete data, without committing to actual deletion.95
During the process, CDT drafted a document detailing the many ad-
ditional differences between the drafts.96 Largely, the differences boiled
down to the difference between envisioning drone use as just another
extension of online surveillance practices, versus distinguishing drone
use as different because it involves gathering information about noncon-
senting individuals in a wide variety of physical locations.
In May 2016, the process was finalized, and the NTIA released a fi-
nal version of the best practices.97 CDT pointed out the positives, noting
that the best practices restrict continuous collection of data about indi-
viduals, require drone operators to minimize both operations and surveil-
lance over private property, and encourage drone operators not o share
information for marketing purposes without consent.9 The ACLU, EFF,
and Access Now, by contrast, presented a strikingly different view. The-
se organizations critiqued the document for allowing drone operators to
collect private data without consent; allowing persistent, continuous ur-
91. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5.
92. BEST PRACTICES COMBINED DRAFT, supra note 80, at 10.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 8.
96. Memorandum from Harley Geiger, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to NTIA Unmanned
Aircraft Sys. Privacy Working Grp. (Nov. 22, 2015),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/comparison of cdt hogan draft bestpracticesfor
drone privacy.pdf.
97. See FINAL BEST PRACTICES, supra note 67.
98. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection, supra note 71.
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veillance without consent, even in traditionally private spaces; and allow-
ing the use of the data for certain purposes without consent.99
The vastly differing readings of the document largely stem from
how skeptically one views the various and numerous potential loopholes
contained within it. If companies wish, they can read these loopholes
(such as exceptions for "compelling purposes," or requirements of just
"reasonable efforts") to largely obviate the good parts of these best prac-
tices. The proof will be in execution and adoption.
In April 2016, the Senate passed a version of FAA reauthorization
that would preempt state drone laws, including drone-specific privacy
laws, and would instruct Congress to build on the NTIA best practices
and recommendations in crafting federal legislation.1" The reactions of
the various civil liberties organizations discussed above, in conjunction
with the more general flaws of the process outlined here, suggest that
over-reliance on the NTIA's output to frame federal drone privacy policy
in the place of state laws would be ill-advised.
III. PLACING THE PROCESS IN THE LITERATURE: CO-REGULATION AND
PENALTY DEFAULTS
Given how laborious the NTIA process is, why is this administra-
tion engaging in it? The NTIA process is founded on the idea that, espe-
cially with regards to evolving technologies, industry is best informed
and best equipped to determine the best way to regulate itself. The gov-
ernment must figure out a way to involve industry in its own regulation;
otherwise, governance risks significant missteps due to lack of
knowledge, or overburdening particular technologies due to lack of ex-
pertise. In this section, I discuss some of the relevant academic literature
that encourages incorporating private expertise into governance, espe-
cially in the data governance space.'ot
If it is a good idea to involve industry in regulation, then why has
this particular method of involvement been relatively unsuccessful?
NTIA negotiations have set weak standards that industry largely has not
adopted, and face dwindling participation by groups on all sides. While
there are multiple potential criticisms of the NTIA process,' 02 the prob-
99. Access Now Letter, supra note 70.
100. Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2016, S. 2658, 114th Cong.
§§ 2104, 2142 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/billl 4th-congress/senate-bill/2658; see also
Malanie Zanona, Senate Send FAA Reauthorization to House, HILL (April 19, 2016, 12:46 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/276828-senate-sends-faa-reauthorization-to-house.
101. See generally Hirsch, supra note 11; Hirsch, supra note 10; Rubinstein, supra note 35;
Thaw, supra note 10.
102. For example, the NTIA subject matter has been technology- or at least sector-specific.
This irritates industry, which feel targeted in the absence of general data privacy law. Another possi-
ble criticism asks whether the NTIA is the right agency for this process. The DOC has a mission to
encourage economic growth. Critics have noted that this mission runs in conflict with consumer
protection, in this space. See Chester, supra note 39.
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lem largely reduces to the current structure of our federal data privacy
regime.
In the second part of this section, I briefly discuss the literature on
"penalty defaults" to provide needed context for the NTIA's struggles.
The idea of a penalty default is that the government can set a baseline
that spurs private parties to negotiate towards a better outcome.'o3 Schol-
ars largely employ this concept to discuss the regulatory backdrop neces-
sary to encourage more efficient private ordering.'" I propose that the
concept of penalty defaults, primarily used to discuss private contracting,
can be useful for discussions of co-regulation like that encountered here.
In the absence of a worse regulatory alternative-that is, enforceable
federal data privacy law-industry has little incentive to meaningfully
participate in the NTIA process.
A. Co-Regulation: Drawing on Industry Expertise
The White House has explained that its primary motive in involving
industry in the privacy space is to harness industry expertise in fast-
moving technological areas.105 The academic literature addressing co-
regulation, also known as collaborative governance, describes the poten-
tial benefits of this approach.1 6 Potential benefits of co-regulation in-
clude obtaining unique knowledge and expertise from industry members;
arriving at more realistic and cost-effective, workable, and innovative
results; creating a stronger sense of industry ownership over rules and
thus higher compliance; and creating more politically practicable and
lower-cost processes.1
While I by no means attempt here to cover the vast literature on col-
laborative governance, the work of three scholars writing about co-
regulation in the data governance space is particularly relevant to discus-
sions of the NTIA. Dennis Hirsch, responding to early versions of the
White House's safe harbor proposal, has studied co-regulation of data
protection in the Netherlands, where industry actors collaborate with the
Dutch government to set sector-specific codes.ios Hirsch noted both
103. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
104. See, e.g., Kristelia A. Garcia, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2014) (identifying "penalty default licenses" and penalty defaults in
general as a mechanism for inducing private ordering).
105. See Hirsch, supra note 10, at 466-68.
106. See Hirsch, supra note I1, at 88 ("[P]roponents of collaborative governance claim that it
can combine the flexibility of business savvy of industry self-regulation with the accountability and
public-spiritedness of government rules .... ); see also Hirsch, supra note 10, at 441 (noting that
co-regulation can provide the "flexibility of self-regulation while adding the supervision and rigor of
government rules"); Thaw, supra note 10, at 333 (noting the possibility to "increase both the repre-
sentative legitimacy and the efficacy of the regulatory process").
107. Hirsch, supra note 10, at 466-67 (citing Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 26 (1997)); see also Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 379-80.
108. Hirsch, supra note 11, at 120-23.
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strengths and weaknesses in the system. 10 The strengths largely involved
obtaining information from industry that regulators otherwise would not
have accessed, and building productive relationships between industry
and regulators founded on mutual trust.1 10 I discuss the weaknesses fur-
ther below.
David Thaw, writing about the creation of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, similarly
touted the benefits of involving nongovernmental expertise in the setting
of cybersecurity standards, through an informal version of negotiated
rulemaking, also known as "reg neg" or "neg reg.""11 Thaw explained
that in the context of the HIPAA Security Rule, a committee of non-
governmental individuals came up with a rule that departed from its
members' individual interests and in fact served the public good.1 12 In-
dustry buy-in to the rule was high, as a consequence of the collaborative
process.113
Ira Rubinstein, writing more generally about the potential role of
co-regulation in U.S. privacy law, highlighted three examples of various
kinds of existing privacy co-regulation: (1) the Network Advertising
Initiative (NAI); (2) the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Agreement; and (3) the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Safe Harbor.1 14 Ru-
binstein concluded that the COPPA Safe Harbor process produced the
best co-regulatory efforts of the three, covering substantive privacy re-
quirements while facing minimal free rider problems and invoking mean-
ingful government enforcement by the FTC.' 15 He noted, nonetheless,
that the COPPA process itself was not particularly successful, pointing to
too-strict statutory requirements as creating inadequate incentives for
industry to self-regulate.1 6
Co-regulation is not a panacea; there are clear potential downsides.
Potential costs include gaming of the system by industry using its infor-
mational advantage to obtain weaker rules; a reduction in the public's
opportunity to participate; capture; lack of enforcement; and deterring
new entrants through coordination by established firms. 1 7 Many of the
checks on co-regulation involve attempted checks on regulatory cap-
ture. 18 The failures of the NTIA process, however, are not a matter of
109. Id. at 151-55.
110. Id. at l54.
111. Thaw, supra note 10, at 353-55.
112. Id. at 364-65.
113. Id at 363.
114. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 384, 390, 394.
115. Id. at 397-98.
116. Id. at 398-99.
117. Hirsch, supra note 10, at 468 (citing NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS
AND LAGGARDS: NEXT-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 104-05 (2002)).
118. Hirsch, supra note 11, at 152 (suggesting third party audits to increase compliance); id. at
153 (suggesting opening up the process to include additional stakeholders such as consumer or
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capture, or at least not in the traditional sense that a particular industry
controls the outcome of the process. The process is open and collabora-
tive, and the NTIA itself serves as a neutral convener rather than a vocal
party. Something else has gone awry. To understand what, I turn to a
second body of relevant literature: on penalty defaults.
B. Penalty Defaults: Getting Private Actors to the Table
The literature on penalty defaults arises in the context of contract
law.1 19 Penalty defaults are regulations that spur private parties to con-
tract by setting a default that neither party wants.1 20 Penalty defaults
should be used, the reasoning goes, to prompt information exchange be-
tween private parties and encourage private ordering that is more effi-
cient than what the government could devise.121 Thus the rationale for
penalty defaults is similar to the rationale for collaborative governance:
private parties are often better situated with respect to expertise and
knowledge about an area than the government. Both literatures address
attempts to draw private parties into the process of creating more effi-
cient arrangements.
Some discussion of regulatory defaults focuses on trying to set the
best default, based on the behavioral understanding that most people will
not opt out.122 But discussion of penalty defaults focuses instead on wel-
fare maximizing by setting an undesirable default, thus encouraging in-
formation flow and negotiations between private actors.123 Prospect theo-
ry posits that people make decisions based on potential gains and loss-
es.124 Setting a negative default thus pushes even risk-averse players to
engage in negotiations.
The literature on co-regulation or collaborative governance engages,
albeit not explicitly, with the idea of the necessity of penalty defaults.
Hirsch, Thaw, and Rubinstein all identify conditions necessary for priva-
cy co-regulation to succeed. Similarly, Philip Harter, the source of nego-
privacy advocacy groups, but recognizing that this may stall negotiations). Thaw refers to his ap-
proach as "enlightened regulatory capture," but his requirements nonetheless target capture con-
cems. Thaw, supra note 10, at 358-59, 371 (discussing FACA openness requirements and the re-
quirement that process include reduced-bias subject matter experts who are not subject to influence
as a function of their employment).
119. lan Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032, 2044 (2012) (advocating using rules "to encourage contracting parties to choose the default or
non-default options that they jointly prefer").
120. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 103, at 91.
121. Id
122. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2003) ("What [people] choose is strongly influenced by details of the
context in which they make their choice, for example default rules.").
123. See Garcia, supra note 104, at 1131 ("This view focuses on selecting an unpalatable
default.. . . [C]ontracting entities [may] be encouraged to negotiate more efficient deal terms to
avoid an unpalatable default.").
124. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
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tiated rulemaking, listed the conditions necessary for that process to suc-
ceed. Looking to these conditions in conjunction with an understanding
of penalty defaults explains why the NTIA process is not working as the
White House desires.
One of Hirsch's recommendations to the United States, derived
from observation of the Dutch system, is to pass a baseline privacy stat-
ute. The United States should pass the statute "not only for the privacy
protections it will bring, but also to provide a structure for the industry
codes and to give companies a strong incentive to come to the table and
negotiate a code of conduct."1 25 Hirsch noted that one of the Dutch in-
dustries' main motivations for drafting codes of conduct "was that it al-
lowed them to clarify the Data Protection Act and achieve a degree of
regulatory certainty."l26 In other words, the Dutch Data Protection Act
served as a penalty default, creating bounded uncertainty that drove in-
dustry to the negotiating table.
Thaw similarly notes that during the HIPAA Security Rule negotia-
tions, the relevant committee believed "that if they failed to act, other
regulators or legislators would, and that would be a suboptimal out-
come."1 2 7 He lists this as one of his five characteristics of "enlightened
regulatory capture:" a perceived detriment to industry if the process
fails.128 Participants in co-regulation must believe, in other words, that
there will be negative and likely-to-occur consequences if they fail. 129
They must believe that there is a penalty default. Thaw points out that
negative consequences are the other side of the coin of one of Harter's
requirement for negotiated rulemaking: an opportunity for parties to
- 130gain.
Rubinstein calls for careful consideration of industry incentives in
creating baseline privacy legislation.'31 That legislation should include
both carrots and sticks, such as a tiered liability system or a threat of
stricter regulations.132 In fact, Rubinstein observes that "the covenanting
approach in the U.S. arises only when there is a credible threat of federal
privacy regulation and firms sit down with regulators to negotiate a code
of conduct in lieu of regulation."1 33 Self-regulation works best when in-
dustry faces potential or actual negative consequences in the alternative.
125. Hirsch, supra note 11, at 159.
126. Id.
127. Thaw, supra note 8, at 365.
128. Id at 371.
129. Id. at 372.
130. Id at 371; Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1,
43 (1982).
131. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 415.
132. Id. at 416.
133. Id at 401.
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Industry actors may gain from co-regulation in a variety of ways.
The gains may be reputational or emotional. In Thaw's example, industry
actors considered service on the relevant committee to be a professional
honor.134 In the context of newer, developing technologies, however, the
"gain" will largely constitute avoiding a worse default. In the absence of
that default, industry actors are unlikely to buy in to the process of nego-
tiating codes of conduct.
IV. LESSONS FOR U.S. DATA PRIVACY LAW
The core concept of penalty defaults is fairly intuitive: people will
negotiate around settings they don't like. For productive co-regulation to
occur, the costs of the default must be higher than the costs of participat-
ing in co-regulation.13 5 This is a fairly intuitive observation, and one
clearly applicable to the failure of the NTIA's multistakeholder process.
The penalty default literature has given thought to the pros and cons
of different kinds of undesirable default settings. One idea might be to
set a punitive default that clearly favors one party over the other.3 6 This
approach, however, risks entrenching negotiating power in the favored
party.137 In the context of data privacy, this could occur in two ways: by
setting a punitive default heavily penalizing privacy violations, or by
setting a default of not penalizing privacy violations (close to the current
situation) thereby "punishing" those whose privacy is violated. Under the
former, privacy advocates and consumer groups would have little incen-
tive to negotiate alternative regimes. Under the latter, which is roughly
descriptive of current U.S. law, industry would have little incentive to
negotiate. Thus under the current U.S. regime, industry's negotiating
position is entrenched. But there are difficulties with setting federal pen-
alties. Swinging the pendulum too far in the other direction will not drive
co-regulation, and government decisions over setting the level of appro-
priate punishment face exactly the kinds of information problems that
collaborative governance seeks to remedy.
Another way to establish a penalty default, however, is to use uncer-
tainty to the government's advantage. This approach could be particular-
ly useful in privacy governance, which is rife with many types of uncer-
tainty. Technological innovation can perpetuate uncertainty.138 Potential
government intervention can introduce uncertainty.1 39 The implementa-
tion of standards, such as those proposed in the Consumer Privacy Bill of
134. Thaw, supra note 10, at 359.
135. Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 373 (recognizing this assertion when discussing Coasean
bargaining, but not explicitly identifying it as a penalty default).
136. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1163.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1172.
139. Id.; see also Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 401 (discussing negotiations of privacy cove-
nants at the GNI under uncertainty).
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Rights Act, rather than specific rules, can introduce uncertainty as to
government interpretation.140
Uncertainty influences decisionmaking.141 The literature on penalty
defaults suggests that the government can actively use uncertainty to
nudge desirable decisionmaking. Regulators can use uncertainty, para-
doxically, to increase efficiency by nudging risk-averse private actors
into negotiations.142 There are several important caveats to this claim.
First, uncertainty must affect both parties-not necessarily equally, but
disproportionate uncertainty will reduce efficiency again by entrenching
the interests of one party.143 Second, uncertainty cannot just be general
uncertainty; it should be sufficiently bounded such that parties are moti-
vated to negotiate.144 Unbounded uncertainty often leads to inefficiency
and under-compliance.145 Bounded uncertainty-uncertainty of a rela-
tively small amount and defined kind-leads to negotiations, especially
when the uncertainty is likely to resolve into a penalty default.'1 Thaw's,
Hirsch's, and Rubinstein's examples all support bounded uncertainty as
an effective way of driving co-regulation in the privacy space.
What are the lessons for U.S. data privacy law? Coupled with evi-
dence from the NTIA negotiations thus far, this suggests that both the
current penalties and the current levels and kinds of uncertainty in the
U.S. privacy regime are not enough to drive industry to the table in effi-
ciency-maximizmig ways. In other words, what penalties there are in U.S.
privacy law are not high enough, or likely enough to be enforced against
a particular industry actor, to drive participation by most of the industry
actors with whom the government wants to co-regulate.
The NTIA process teaches that the current backdrop of potential
FTC enforcement is not enough to get industry to the table. Moreover,
the possibility of FTC enforcement of the codes of conduct themselves
140. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1173 (citing Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 605 (1992)).
141. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1518-19 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
142. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1169; see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement o Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1035 (1995) (show-
ing "how ambiguity can induce bargainers to act more cooperatively").
143. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1169; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accre-
tion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 884 (2007) (explaining how uncertainty in
copyright law combined with "risk aversion that pervades . . . copyright industries" results in unnec-
essary and thus inefficient licensing); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain
Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986).
144. Garcia, supra note 104, at 1132-33 (explaining that "bounded" uncertainty in the statutory
license context in copyright includes knowing that the penalty default will at some point exist, and
knowing the form in which it will eventually exist).
145. Id. at 1176.
146. Id at 1177 (describing "the efficiency-enhancing effects of bounded uncertainty coupled
with an unpalatable fallback").
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actually drives industry to view both the negotiation and adoption of
codes of conduct as leading to more likely enforcement by the FTC. The
current system is precisely backwards: industry views the NTIA codes of
conduct as potentially creating a penalty, not avoiding one. This in-
creased possibility of FTC enforcement discourages industry f om adopt-
ing codes of conduct once they have been created, exacerbating the free
rider problem. And it discourages industry from even negotiating, out of
fear that completed codes might be viewed as actual industry standards
by the FTC, driving FTC enforcement even without explicit adoption of
the codes by particular players.
The faults in the NTIA process further teach that the current state of
unbounded uncertainty over whether Congress might enact federal data
privacy law is not enough, by itself, to drive industry actors to the nego-
tiating table.147 The absence of data privacy legislation certainly leads to
regulatory uncertainty. As John Morris, associate administrator and di-
rector of Internet policy at the NTIA, expressed: "We're trying to work
on facial recognition without legislation.. . . Consumers and companies
need to know what the rules are for this technology and we think stop-
ping the discussion at this point doesn't get clarity that's needed."1 48 But
the failure of the NTIA process shows that the current lack of regulatory
certainty is by itself not enough to drive effective information disclosure
and negotiations.
The failure of the NTIA process, viewed through the lens of penalty
default literature, suggests that a voluntary multistakeholder technique
that has been shown to work in the technical standard space is not appro-
priate when applied to privacy. 149 Thaw argues, in the cybersecurity con-
text, that there is nothing particularly special about technical standards,
since the purpose of administrative law generally is to hone government
expertise and harness private xpertise.o5 0 He does suggest, however, that
the linked nature of industry interests in the cybersecurity space-the
fact that one player's failure will have negative externalities for other
players-incentivizes players to come to the table to self-regulate.1 5 ' The
lens of penalty defaults suggests that in some technologically complex
subject matter areas, a lack of coordination between actors may itself
serve as a penalty default, preventing interoperability or leaving room for
the types of negative externalities Thaw discusses. In data privacy nego-
tiations, by contrast, the players tend not to come into the room seeking
147. Contra id at 1180 (describing uncertainty over federal copyright lawmaking as driving
private ordering in that space).
148. Peterson, supra note 52.
149. Thanks to Dennis Hirsch for this observation. Compare the NTIA stakeholder process to
W3C.
150. Thaw, supra note 10, at 369 ("The idea that a highly technical subject would distinguish
cybersecurity regulation from other regulation overlooks one of the core purposes of administrative
agencies.").
151. Id. at 368.
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consensus, and the subject matter of privacy, at least for now, produces
no natural penalty for failure negotiate.152
To drive productive co-regulation in this space, the U.S. privacy re-
gime must increase penalties, and-or shift from unbounded to bounded
uncertainty. This could be accomplished through the enactment of some-
thing like the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, which describes data
practices in broad standards, backed by FTC enforcement. The Act pro-
poses creating, in other words, a penalty default with more bounded un-
certainty over what, exactly, the standards require. For that system to
work, however, FTC enforcement will have to occur at a high enough
probability, and with high enough penalties, to drive actors to meaning-
fully negotiate more efficient alternatives.15 3 The political will for this
type of legislation does not appear high; perhaps, however, pressure from
the EU over data privacy may spur Congress to more seriously consider
it.154
Federal data privacy legislation that establishes a penalty default us-
ing bounded uncertainty is likely to be the best option for driving the
kind of privacy co-regulation that our government envisions. As we wait
for federal legislation, however, there may be other ways to presently
improve the NTIA process. First, Congress could propose sector-specific
legislation, creating the pending threat of regulation even if it does not
intend to enact it, more obviously bounding the uncertainty under which
the NTIA negotiations happen. Pending legislation has led to industry
self-regulation in the past.155 Second, the NTIA could play an infor-
mation-gathering function in which it highlights for participants the other
regulatory options on the table, including costly state-by-state regulation,
and any Congressional proposals.
Third, the FTC could more visibly play the hammer, or the penalty
default, targeting precisely those industries in which the NTIA wants to
drive negotiations, to provide an unpalatable backstop. The FTC could
either enforce in spaces where NTIA negotiations have failed, or enforce
in spaces before NTIA negotiations really commence. This approach
would better work for more established industries, however, since FTC
regulation in a very new area risks being unattached to industry stand-
ards. The paradox is that if an industry is particularly new, there won't
yet be industry standards for the FTC to enforce. Hence, the FTC may be
152. Harter describes, as a condition for reg neg regulatory negotiations, that parties cannot
come into negotiations with fundamentally opposing values. Harter, supra note 130, at 19.
153. This Article leaves aside, for the moment, discussion of what level of both auditing and
enforcement would ensure the efficacy of those privately negotiated safe harbors.
154. See Aaron Souppouris, The EU-US Privacy Shield Is up, But It's Future Is in Doubt,
ENGADGET (July 12, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/07/12/eu-us-privacy-shield-data-
protection/; see also Klint Finley, Privacy Shield Will Let U.S. Tech Giants Grab Europeans' Data,
WIRED (July 12, 2016, 7:03 PM).
155. See Rubinstein, supra note 35, at 401 (describing the GNI covenanting process as occur-
ring in the shadow of proposed regulation).
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ill-equipped to create the penalty default against which the NTIA can
encourage negotiations in these new technological spaces.
So perhaps the bigger lesson is that the NTIA process is, under cur-
rent U.S. privacy law, particularly unsuited to exactly the task to which it
has been assigned: to drive negotiations by private actors and stakehold-
ers in emerging industries, before other government entities are equipped
to contemplate regulations. The NTIA process, paradoxically, may be
better suited to application in areas where the FTC or states have already
created enforcement mechanisms. Its information-drawing and negotia-
tion-driving functions, given the current lack of U.S. federal data privacy
law, are limited. For the NTIA process to work as contemplated-for it
to effectively pull both information and expertise from private actors-
the United States must establish an effective privacy penalty default.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of federal data privacy law, the White House has
employed the NTIA to engage in a version of co-regulation of privacy in
three nascent sectors. That process has largely failed. The government's
motives of wanting to involve private expertise in the process are sound;
the regulatory backdrop to the process, however, is ineffective. If the
United States wants to engage in co-regulation in data governance, we
must create a penalty default that makes it more palatable for private
actors to engage in this type of co-regulation. Among the many reasons
for enacting federal data privacy law, I here add another: well-crafted
federal data privacy law may be essential for exactly the kind of co-
regulation that our government envisions. In the meantime, reliance on
the substance of the NTIA's output for constructing regulation is ill-
advised.
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